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This article reviews the regulatory framework for joint ventures and presents some proposals
for its improvement. Korean competition law does not define a joint venture, not even a
concentration from substantive points of view. An establishment of a joint venture can be
assumed as either a concentration or a cartel. Therefore, there is a possibility of double control of
this single behavior, which could severely threaten legal certainty and predictability.
Against this background, this article attempts to define the establishment of a joint venture
substantively, and it means an acquisition of joint control to a newly created company by two or
more undertakings. Considering that a joint venture has an ambivalent nature, or pro- and
anticompetitive effects, it is suggested that a joint venture accompanied by structural changes in
the participating firms will be dealt with in principle under merger control, where its cooperative
effects are reviewed altogether. A joint venture for simple cooperation should be processed within
a simplified procedure under certain circumstances. This would result in procedural economies
without harming effective competition. 
I. Introduction
1. Background
The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act of Korea (hereafter “the
Act”) contains various kinds of instruments for the protection of fair and free
competition. It prohibits abuse of market dominance, cartels, and unfair trade
practices on the one hand, and market concentrations on the other hand. The
regulation of market concentrations requires, unlike other things, assessment
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of competitive effects due to the challenged M&A transaction in a prospective
manner. The Korea Fair Trade Commission (hereafter “the KFTC”), upon
finding any serious competitive concerns, has the authority to impose
corrective measures and surcharges, and to file a criminal complaint for
prosecution (Article 5, 6, 16, 21, 22, 24, 24-2, 71 I of the Act). Any undertaking
that has caused injury to other persons in violation of the Act is liable for
compensation of actual damages (Article 56 of the Act).
Along with ongoing environmental changes, especially globalization,
liberalization and consolidation during the last two decades, firms have come
to cooperate with one another. One of the main instruments for their
collaboration has been an establishment of a joint venture. In response to these
rapid market changes, the KFTC has continuously modernized the
competition laws of Korea in terms of substantive and procedural aspects.
Above all, the KFTC reformed in 2007 the Notice on Merger Review1) (enacted
in 1998) and applied vigorously the merger controls of Korea to a number of
concentrations, whether domestic or international. Further, the Guidelines for
Cartel Review was published in 2002 (revised in 2007)2) which accepted to
some extent the recent developments of cartel regulation abroad. However,
there remain many uncertain issues, which could threaten the effective
protection of the competition order in Korea.
So is the case with an establishment of a joint venture. A joint venture is by
nature of structural change and behavioral coordination neither de lege lata
clearly classified into mergers or collaborative conducts, nor reviewed in
terms of well-defined legal principles. Setting reasonable rules for joint
ventures from substantive and procedural standpoints is of utmost
importance, because joint ventures constitute about 20 to 30% of all notified
concentrations yearly and those joint ventures are exposed to the risk of
double control as discussed below. However, there has been no case where an
establishment of joint venture was declared to substantially lessen
competition in the relevant market and thereby prohibited. In the area of
cartel enforcement, uncertainty prevails, mainly because a joint venture
without being notified could be prohibited through an ex post investigation
434 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 8: 433
1) KFTC, Notice No. 2007/12 on Merger Review, 12. 20. 2007.
2) KFTC, Guidelines No. 49 for Cartel Review, 12. 21. 2007.
by the KFTC.
2. Challenging Issues 
Under the Act, there is a basic and long-standing question of what kind of
combination between undertakings should be understood as a merger or a
cartel from a competition law perspective. After any answer is given to this
problem, joint ventures as legal terminology could find certain contours of
their own. And then, it can be clarified how the collaborative nature of a joint
venture could be assessed under consideration that an agreement to establish
structural change of participating undertakings is likely to raise concerns of
competitor collaboration.
Collaborative conducts, which are in practice called joint ventures,
strategic alliances, etc., could have some conflicting effects on the relevant
markets due to their ambivalent nature. Therefore, the ways for the KFTC to
assess such complicated effects of a joint venture, taking all the circumstances
into account and avoiding procedural diseconomies, should be developed.
For that purpose, not only substantive but also procedural rules for reviewing
joint ventures should be improved.  Such rules can be called as “an integrated
and simplified approach”.
II. Legal Definition of Joint Ventures
1. Definition of concentrations
1) De lege lata
The Act defines concentrations between undertakings simply as one of the
conducts described exhaustively under Article 7 I. There are 5 types of
conduct, as follows:
a. the acquisition or ownership of stocks of another company; 
b. the concurrent holding of an officer’s position in another
company by an officer or employee;
c. a merger with another company; 
d. an acquisition by transfer, lease or acceptance by mandate of the
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whole or material part of the business of another company, or the
acquisition by transfer of the whole or material part of the fixed assets
used for the business of another company; or
e. participation in the establishment of a new company, i.e. a joint
venture. 
The legal definition above is said to focus mainly on formal instruments
rather than any substantive feature of a concentration. This accompanies some
legal uncertainties and hampers procedural economies by unnecessarily
encompassing too many concentrations under merger control.3) In case of a
joint venture, any joint acquisition of other stocks satisfies the requirement of
concentration, notwithstanding an obligation to notify it to the KFTC.
Moreover, the Act does not distinguish between transactions which are likely
to cause any structural change of corporate control or simply to accompany
any behavioral coordination.
2) Substantive element of a concentration
As described above, the Act does not contain any substantive element of a
concentration in terms of competition law. Theoretically, the distinguishing
feature of concentrations from simply collaborative activities lies in that one of
the pre-existing undertakings, as a result of the concentration, ceases to exist
as an independent economic entity.4) This corresponds to the purpose of
market concentration regulation. Integration into a single economic entity
occurs on a legal or de facto basis; the former, a merger agreement, the latter,
an acquisition of shares. 
It is necessary to first discuss whether such a substantive definition of a
concentration can be derived from any provisions concerning prior
notification, because only concentrations subject to mandatory notification
under Article 12 of the Act could raise competition concerns requiring further
review. Under the Act, a company should notify to the KFTC, especially if it
holds at least 20% (15% for a publicly listed or registered corporation) of the
total number of stocks issued by another company, it becomes the largest
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shareholder by additionally acquiring shares of another company after
notifying the combination of enterprises, or it acquires the largest stocks of a
new company to be established (§12 I No. 1, 2 and 5 of the Act). Whereas
being the largest stockholder normally implies a kind of control relationship
between acquiring and acquired firm, acquisition of 15 or 20% of total stocks
would not automatically show any strong links between them.
The concept of a control relationship, which tends to view two separate
legal entities as a single economic entity, is found in the Notice for Merger
Review, although it was misplaced because the Notice was aimed at
providing an approach to be taken by the KFTC and the criteria for
determining whether a concentration, as defined per Article 7 of the Act, may
substantially restrain competition in the relevant market, and then whether
there would be any objective justifications that outweigh the competition
concerns, e.g. efficiency-enhancing effect or acquisition of failing firms (Article
7 II No. 1, 2. and V of the Act). The logic is, however, somewhat ironic,
because a transaction lacking any control relationship between participants
cannot be deemed a concentration from a teleological perspective and it
therefore needs not be subject to competition scrutiny at all.
From the discussion above, “control relationship” can be inferred as a core
element of the legal definition of a concentration, and what matters is the
acquisition of control of one undertaking by another. Control can be acquired
by a single undertaking or by several undertakings. The latter represents the
case of a joint venture, as follows. It can be suggested de lege ferenda that a
general, comprehensive clause based on the substantive element of “single or
joint control” should substitute for exhaustive illustration of legal instruments
of concentration. In this case, the criteria for identifying a control relationship
would rather be provided in detail in another Notice instead of the current
Notice.
2. Joint ventures under merger regulation
1) Approaches
The Act neither uses nor defines the term “joint ventures” at any place.
Commentators argue without doubt that No. 5 of Article 7 I of the Act, which
illustrates “the participation into a creation of new company” as one type of a
concentration, means a joint venture. No. 7 of Article 19 I of the Act, which
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describes “a creation of companies etc. to carry out jointly the main area of
commercial activities” as one example of cartel, also represents a kind of joint
venture.5) Here, to define a joint venture in detail has been left to lawyers and
economists. 
Antitrust discussions on joint ventures developed in the U.S. during the
last several decades seem to give no clear guidance to this dogmatic work.
Prof. Pitofsky, the former chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (1995-
2001), lamented earlier that, in the antitrust field of the U.S., there has not been
any generally accepted legal definition of joint ventures.6) One defined joint
venture as “any association of two or more firms for carrying out some
activities that each firm might otherwise perform alone,”7) another defined it
as “a cooperation that falls short of a complete merger.”8) However, this overly
broad definition of joint ventures does not help to clarify their genuine
competition concerns. The former excludes, without any reasonable
explanation, joint ventures between companies which otherwise individually
could not enter a new market,9) while the latter ignores the substantive
differences among various forms of collaboration, e.g. equity joint ventures,
stock-swapping, joint R&D, and sharing of production facilities and/or
distribution networks, etc. A typology such as that joint ventures can be
divided per their functions into R&D, production, distribution ventures etc., is
nothing but a simple description of economic phenomena, and it therefore
does not provide any useful guides in order to systematically analyze the
complicated effects of a joint venture from a competition law perspective.
Furthermore, even the definition developed in company law cannot work
without modification,10) mainly because definitions in law should be made
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foreign capital. DONG-YOON JUNG, THE COMPANY LAW 44 (2000); HUN-JAE SEO, CASEBOOK COMPANY
under consideration of its own goal.11)
Here, the starting point is the definition of a concentration described
above: control of another undertaking by one or more undertaking(s). Joint
ventures subject to merger regulation can be thereby assumed from joint
control of another undertaking by two or more undertakings. That is, in case
of an establishment of a new joint venture, it is deemed to be a concentration
between several acquiring companies on the one hand, and the acquired joint
venture on the other hand. That is of much importance, attempting to classify
various forms of joint ventures into horizontal, vertical or conglomerate
merger and calculating turnover and market shares of participating firms on
the basis of any classification.12)
Under merger regulations of Korea, the establishment of a joint venture is
not captured by No. 5 of Article 7I of the Act if all the participating companies
are “specially related persons” as defined under Article 11 of the Enforcement
Decree of the Act (hereafter “the Decree”). That means, the participating
companies which stand under the same control and therefore belong to the
same corporate group, are deemed to be a single economic entity, and
therefore, the establishment of a joint venture where only such affiliates are
involved gives rise to a single dominance (Article 3 of the Decree).13) Besides,
an establishment of a joint venture whose stocks are owned 100% by one
company will be neither a joint venture nor even any concentration subject to
the merger control under the Act.14)
Finally, a joint venture could be deemed a concentration in terms of No. 5
merger regulation only where its legal form is a corporation, whereas a joint
venture could exist as a cartel regardless of its legal form, i.e. corporation,
association, etc.  Joint ventures in the form of a corporation should be one that
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is newly created, if that joint venture can be regulated by merger or cartel
controls.15) Therefore, if C acquires 50% stocks of B which is 100% controlled
by A, and then a joint control between A and C is established, then the
acquisition of C cannot be subject to Article 7 I No. 5 of the Act. In the same
context, a transition from single control to joint control due to corporate
restructuring is not a participation in the establishment of a joint venture, but
simply an another acquisition of stocks.
2) Assessment of joint control
In Korean merger control regime, it does not matter whether and how
“joint” control is established. More important is that two or more companies
jointly acquire stocks of the newly created joint venture for the purpose of
control. Therefore, in case that two or more companies jointly acquire stocks of
another non-newly created firm, a concentration in the meaning of Article 7 I
No. 1, not No. 5, matters. So the element “joint” is given little importance. For
further criteria in order to assess joint control, the Jurisdictional Notice of the
EC will be helpful.16) Whether any control relationship between two or more
acquiring firms and the acquired joint venture is likely to be created through
the challenged transaction, is assessed as follows. 
In principle, control relationship as of a joint venture is to be assessed
under the same criteria applied to single control through stock acquisition. In
case of an acquisition or ownership of shares, a control relationship can be
easily inferred, provided that the shareholding ratio of the acquiring firms is
50% or more. Even if the shareholding ratio of the acquiring firms is less than
50%, a control relationship can be inferred if the acquiring firms can influence
the acquired joint venture considering the following in general (V 1, 3 of the
2007 Notice):
(1) shareholding ratio of each stockholder, distribution of shares,
mutual relationship among stockholders;
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(2) whether the acquired joint venture gets its main raw materials
from the acquiring firms;
(3) interlocking directorate between the acquiring firms and the
acquired joint venture; and
(4) the existence of transactional relation, money relation, or affiliate
relation between the acquiring firms and acquired joint venture.
Additionally, if more than 2 companies acquire stocks of another
company, which corresponds not necessarily to the creation of a joint venture,
the shareholding ratio, gap, and mutual relation of each acquiring companies
and the purpose of acquiring stock and contractual relation for the acquiring
stock, are to be considered. The control does not have to be non-transitory;
only temporary control is sufficient. 
The Act does not differentiate between full-function and partial function
joint venture. As a result, an establishment of a joint venture carrying out only
a small part of business activities can be regulated as a concentration. The
same applies for a joint venture regulated as a cartel.
3. Nature and effects of joint ventures
1) Ambivalent nature of joint ventures
Under the Act, an establishment of a joint venture pursuing common
management of a “main” business part could also be challenged ex post by the
KFTC, considering whether it is likely to unduly restrain competition (Article
19 I No. 7 of the Act). As a result, provisions concerning merger regulation
and cartel prohibition are likely to apply to an agreement to establish a joint
venture in parallel but within different procedures. This raises the problem of
double control to a single identical behavior.17) It should also be noted that an
establishment of a joint venture would be treated as a cartel between the
participating companies that compete in the same product and geographical
market.18) Ancillary agreements accompanying the establishment of a joint
venture will be reviewed as a whole under the Guidelines. Therefore, the
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establishment of a joint venture which is likely to be allowed as a
concentration due to lack of substantial lessening of competition in the
meaning of Article 7 I of the Act, could be prohibited ex post as an unduly anti-
competitive cartel.
There are more differences from the procedural treatment of joint
ventures. In case of a concentration, the contracting parties to a joint venture
have the obligation to pre-notify it to the KFTC under certain requirements,
whereas there is no obligatory notification for a cartel-like joint venture. The
KFTC should notify the results of its merger review to the parties within 30
days—it can be delayed to within 90 days if necessary—(Article 12 VI and VII
of the Act), whereas a cartel case has neither obligatory notification nor any
time limit to be finished.19)
Most serious is the difference of their legal effects. If a joint venture is
considered to substantially lessen competition in the market, the KFTC may
impose corrective measures and, if necessary, periodical fine (Article 16, 17-3 I
of the Act). On the contrary, firms that engaged in a cartel-like joint venture
will almost always be sanctioned by fine of up to 10% of the related turnover
(Article 22 of the Act). 
All of this increases legal uncertainty and unpredictability. As a result,
undertakings committing to an establishment of a joint venture are obliged to
notify the timeline for the concentration and are persuaded to simultaneously
apply for an exemption for anti-competitive but outweighing, efficiency-
generating cartel. This would necessarily threaten economies of procedure. In
sum, the destiny of a joint venture to a large extent will be up to the art of the
initiated procedure.20)
2) Ambivalent effects of joint ventures
A joint venture between competitors is likely to warrant economies of
scale based on cost savings, to make possible risk-sharing in especially high-
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tech industries, synergy effects etc. and thereby to facilitate effective
competition in the long run.21) On the contrary, joint ventures may help to
coordinate competitive behaviors between participating companies on the
relevant market and/or aggravate market structure through monopolization
and foreclosure effects.22)
Positive and negative effects of a joint venture can be assessed according to
the theoretical backgrounds. However, the identification of its various, often
conflicting competitive effects is not so simple. Calculation of efficiency is
often unclear and there are still many obstacles to its legal acceptance.23)
Therefore, any definite answer to probable effects of a joint venture is not
allowed. As follows, however, some policy implications can be derived from
controversial discussions on the possible effects of joint ventures.
First, joint venture as an optimal form of organization has the potential to
bring about innovation, which tends in turn to facilitate further rivalry.
Second, supplementary relationship between efficiency and competition
should be taken into account in assessing competitive effects of joint ventures,
provided the efficiency can be proved as specific to the joint venture, verifiable
and likely to arise in the short term. Finally, economies of procedure and legal
certainty do not always work in contradiction to the just results of substantive
analysis. It is especially the case, when effects anticipated from the joint
venture necessarily seem conflicting and the legal survival of it depends on
the selected procedure under the current regime of double control as
proceeded below.
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III. The Privilege of Concentration
1. Practice of the KFTC
The possibility of double control of a single behavior for establishing a
joint venture does not seem desirable as mentioned above. Double control
threatens legal certainty and predictability in applying the Act. Looking into
the practice of the KFTC, the problem of double control has not yet been
realized. Undertakings which are willing to establish a joint venture notify
their plans in advance to the KFTC, but so far there has not been a single case
where corrective measures were imposed because of its anti-competitive
effects as a concentration. More precisely, there has been no joint venture case
where in-depth investigation was initiated under merger control.
On the contrary, there have been several cartel cases where the KFTC
intervened ex post. Almost all the joint venture cases prohibited as a cartel by
the KFTC concerned sales or marketing venture between actual competitors.24)
According to the consistent precedents, the KFTC took a somewhat strict
structural approach to a cartel-like joint venture, where the aggregate market
share of the participants was considered as of highest importance. Therefore,
the KFTC found those joint ventures as threatening to substantially lessen
competition based directly on the fact that the aggregate market shares of their
participants amounted to over 60% or 90.9%.25) Sometimes, it was also
considered, although not most importantly, whether the joint venture
pursuing cooperation of each sales activities restricted price or output of the
targeted item.26) Recently, a joint organization for bid-rigging was challenged
and sanctioned because of its anti-competitive pricing behaviors.27)
However, the problem of double control may come true at any time. For
setting effective regulatory framework in the future, it will be helpful to carry
out comparative analysis on the procedural approaches to a joint venture.
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2. Examples of the EC and Germany
1) EC Law
Article 3 IV of the EC Merger Regulation (hereafter “the ECMR”),
amended 2004, provides that the creation of a joint venture performing on a
lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity shall
constitute a concentration within the meaning of Article 3 I b. Before the
ECMR had been adopted in 1989, the European Commission (hereafter “the
Commission”) was able to regulate concentrations and cartels according to
Article 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. An establishment of a joint venture had
been treated as a coordination of competitors’ behaviors, i.e. cartel. At the time
the ECMR was adopted, the legal status of joint ventures was fiercely
discussed in order to clearly delineate the jurisdiction of European and
national competition laws28) and to favor concentrative ventures from
substantive and procedural aspects. This was named as “the privilege of
concentration”.29) And until the 1st revision of the ECMR in 1997, the
distinction between concentrative and cooperative joint ventures, which was
developed earlier in German competition law, had been widely accepted in
the practice of competition authorities in the EU. As a result, a joint venture
that performs on a lasting basis all the functions of an independent economic
unit, was to be under exclusive jurisdiction of European merger control,
unless it is likely to coordinate competitive behaviors between participating
companies.
Meanwhile, the Commission had interpreted the two elements of
concentrative joint ventures so broadly that most of the joint ventures had
been brought into the scrutiny of European merger control. And the revised
ECMR of 1997 codified the practice of the Commission by substituting
concentrative, cooperative joint ventures for full-function, partial function
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see critical views, Carolin B. Hösch, Rechtssicherheit im EG-Wettbewerbsrecht nun auch für
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ones. After that revision, in case of a full-function joint venture, whether or not
there is a possibility to coordinate participators’ behavior, the Commission
was to review all the competitive concerns resulting from those ventures and
various ancillary agreements in a more transparent and unified procedure of
European merger control. It was anticipated to enhance legal certainty at least
with respect to collaborations between competitors like joint ventures.30)
2) German Law
In German competition law, namely “Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbes-
chränkungen” (GWB), a joint venture is understood somewhat differently
from that of European competition law. Article 37 I No. 3 paragraph 3 GWB
provides that if two or more undertakings acquire equity of another
undertaking simultaneously or one after another, then a concentration
between them is deemed to be created in the market where the joint ventures
is supposed to be active. It is thereby assumed to be a partial merger (so
called, Teilfusion) between participating companies,31) and such an approach
was said to be fit for taking spill-over effects between them into account that
are likely to arise through that joint venture.
Under the concept of “partial merger,” many commentators and the
practice of the German competition authority, i.e. the Bundeskartellamt,
divided joint ventures into two categories: concentrative and cooperative
ventures. The former is subject to merger control, and the latter the prohibition
of cartel (so called Trennungstheorie).32) In the meanwhile, the BGH accepted
the Zweischranken-Theorie that, in certain circumstances, prohibition of cartel
and merger control could be applied parallel to a joint venture because the
two are supplementary with each other and the categorization of joint
ventures into the above two, is not always simple.33) The BGH accepted,
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33) WuW/E BGH 2169 = BGH 96, 69 “Mischwerke” (1986). See comments to this BGH
decision, Kurt Stockmann, Verwaltungsgrundsätze und Gemeinschaftsunternehmen, WuW 269 
however, the exclusive application of merger control to an establishment of a
joint venture not accompanying any behavioral coordination between the
participating companies.34) After that, in the practice of the Bundeskartellamt,
concentrative joint ventures have been so widely construed and exclusively
subject to merger control, considering that merger control has some
procedural and substantive merits in contrast with cartel prohibition.35) By
means of this approach, the Bundeskartellamt no doubt aims at facilitating
innovative joint ventures and thereby enhancing international
competitiveness of domestic industries.
3. Some implications
Joint ventures cannot be defined and tested sui generis as a concentration
or a cartel. The division of concentrative/cooperative or full-function/partial
function joint venture had been conceptualized from the perspective of
competition policy, not from legal dogmatism or theoretical perfectionism.
The only common character found in various forms of joint ventures is
ambivalence of their nature: structural change and possible coordination
thereto.
Therefore, the point is how to construct legal conditions that joint ventures
need to be processed in terms of a merger, which are able to contribute toward
eliminating expensive double control in favor of legal certainty and
predictability of participating companies. This will be helpful for taking a
number of complicated factors into account, which makes possible a
comprehensive assessment of a joint venture as a whole.36) To this end, it
seems thinkable to make only joint ventures lacking any structural change on
a lasting basis subject to the cartel prohibition; other joint ventures will be
reviewed under the merger control, where the danger of competitors’
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allgemeiner Verwaltungs-grundsätze, AG 329 (1987).
34) BGHZ 96, 69 = WuW/E BGH 2169 “Mischwerke.”
35) The elements of concentrative joint ventures are in general identical with those of full-
function ones.
36) Lee, supra note 3, at 78.
collusion can be checked as a whole under the Act.
IV. Integrated procedure for Joint Ventures as a
Concentration
1. Examples of the EU and the U.S. and Korea
As explained above, a joint venture of full-functionality is subject
exclusively to merger control in Europe, if it has a Community dimension
(Article 3 IV of the ECMR). The participating companies are obliged therefore
to pre-notify that joint venture to the Commission, which in turn is reviewed
in terms of the “significant impediment to effective competition” (SIEC) test.
Ancillary restraints accompanying the joint venture, which would be by their
nature subject to Article 81 EC Treaty, are appraised within the same
procedural framework (so called, “one-stop-shop”).
On the contrary, there is not any special, integrated procedure designed to
effectively review two different aspects of a joint venture in the U.S. Such an
integrated procedure concerning mergers, including joint ventures, is not
found in Korea.
2. Proposals
In Korea, where firms decide to establish a joint venture, they are obliged
to pre-notify it to the KFTC and will also be challenged ex post in terms of
illegal collusion. Under the current KFTC’s organization chart, business
concentrations and cartel cases are reviewed by “the Merger Division” and
“the Cartel Investigation Bureau”, respectively. This dual procedure threatens
legal certainty and consistence of decisions made by the KFTC. Not the least, it
is difficult for the involved Division and the Bureau to cooperate and screen
all the competition concerns imminent in the same joint venture. In order to
escape from this problematic situation, it can be desirable to introduce one-
stop shop in the sense that concentrative and cooperative effects of a joint
venture would be reviewed under an integrated procedure. For this task to be
carried out, some organizational changes will also be needed.
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V. Simplified procedure for certain Joint Ventures 
1. Examples of the EU and the U.S. and Korea
In Europe, “the Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain
concentrations under Council Regulation No. 139/2004 of 2005”37) and “the
Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict
competition under Article 81 (1) of 2001”38) set out a simplified procedure for
full-function joint ventures subject to the ECMR and for partial function ones
subject to Article 81 of the EC Treaty, respectively. The former provides that
the Commission will apply the simplified procedure to certain categories of
concentrations in terms of turnover and market share, and it will adopt a
short-form decision declaring a concentration compatible with the common
market:
(a) two or more undertakings acquire joint control of a joint
venture, provided that the joint venture has no, or negligible, actual or
foreseen activities within the territory of the European Economic Area
(EEA). Such cases occur where:
(i) the turnover of the joint venture and/or the turnover of the
contributed activities is less than EUR 100 million in the EEA
territory; and
(ii) the total value of assets transferred to the joint venture is less
than EUR 100 million in the EEA territory;
(b) two or more undertakings acquire joint control of another
undertaking, provided that none of the parties to the concentration are
engaged in business activities in the same product and geographical
market, or in a product market which is upstream or downstream of a
product market in which any other party to the concentration is
engaged;
(c) two or more undertakings acquire joint control of another
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undertaking and:
(i) two or more of the parties to the concentration are engaged in
business activities in the same product and geographical
market (horizontal relationships) provided that their combined
market share is less than 15 %; or
(ii) one or more of the parties to the concentration are engaged in
business activities in a product market which is upstream or
downstream of a product market in which any other party to
the concentration is engaged (vertical relationships), provided
that none of their individual or combined market shares is at
either level 25% or more;
In case of the latter Notice, the Commission will not institute proceedings
either upon application or on its own initiative, if the aggregate market share
held by the parties to the agreement does not exceed 10% on any of the
relevant markets affected by the agreement, where the agreement is made
between actual or potential competitors on any of these markets; or if the
market share held by each of the parties to the agreement does not exceed 15%
on any of the relevant markets affected by the agreement, where the
agreement is made between non-competitors on any of these markets. In cases
where it is difficult to classify the agreement as either an agreement between
competitors or an agreement between non-competitors, the 10% threshold is
applicable.
On the contrary, a special procedure for joint venture is not found in the
U.S. Therefore, it is not clear whether a joint venture will be subject to Section
2 of the Sherman Act or Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Instead, the
Collaboration Guidelines of 2000 in the U.S.39) provides only a safe harbor for
certain joint activities in order to enhance legal certainty and economies of
procedure. In case of joint ventures, for example, antitrust authorities will not
challenge a joint venture unless the aggregate market share of participating
companies and the joint venture exceeds 20% on the relevant market.
In Korea, there is neither in the Act nor in the Guidelines a safe harbor for
joint ventures considered to be a collusion. According to the Guidelines, joint
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ventures are treated as a non-hardcore cartel and reviewed in terms of the rule
of reason. As above described, the revised Notice for Merger Review of 2007
provides for several cases subject to a simplified review procedure, where the
notified concentration is presumed to create no competition concerns and in
principle reviewed with respect to the truth of notified facts to be cleared
within 15 days from the date of acceptance of that notification (III of the 2007
Notice). The cases for this fast track are assumed, for example, if the
participating companies are in a special relationship with each other, or
between acquiring or acquired firms any control relationship is not created, or
companies other than Large Corporations in the meaning of Article 12-2 of the
Decree are involved in a conglomerate merger, or in the event the market
share of the company or market concentration of the transaction territory after
the combination falls under the following criteria (II 1 of the 2007 Notice):
(A) the following for horizontal M&A: 
less than 1,200 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (a measure of
market concentration; hereinafter referred to as “HHI”)
1,200 to 2,500 HHI, HHI increase of less than 250
more than 2,500 HHI, and HHI increase of less than 150
(B) the following for vertical M&A or conglomerate M&A:
the HHI is less than 2,500, and the market share is less than
25%. 
the ranking of the company in each area of trade is less than
no. 4.
2. Proposals
However, it seems to be unclear whether, under the current regime, an
establishment of a joint venture will be subject to such a simplified review
procedure or not. A joint venture, which is to be subject to merger control
because of its concentrative nature, should be notified to the KFTC under
Article 12 of the Act. Unless it satisfies any of the above mentioned cases, it
will be reviewed in depth with respect to the criteria of whether effective
competition is likely to be harmed through the challenged joint venture.
However, it is not clear how the thresholds for simplified procedure be
applied or interpreted in case of concentrative full-function joint ventures. It
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can be also very controversial how joint ventures are to be classified into
horizontal, vertical or conglomerate mergers. In this context, most important is
that substantive matters, e.g. calculation methods of joint venture’s turnover40)
and classification criteria of joint ventures, should be clearly provided in the
Notice.
If a joint venture is otherwise characterized by its cooperative nature, it can
be suggested that it enjoys a safe harbor too in that joint ventures by
companies with small market share would not be likely to unduly restrict
competition in the market. For example, one can conceive of joint ventures
whose mother companies have less than 20 percent aggregate market share.
This suggestion can also be desirable for other forms of competitors’
cooperation except for several hardcore cartels.
VI. Conclusion
Korean competition law does not define a joint venture, not even a
concentration from the substantive points of view. An establishment of a joint
venture can be assumed either as a concentration or a cartel to a broader
extent. Therefore, there is a possibility of double control of this single
behavior. This would thereby severely threaten legal certainty and
predictability.
An establishment of a joint venture should be defined substantively as an
acquisition of joint control to a newly created company by two or more
undertakings under merger control. Otherwise, it should be dealt as a simple
collaboration under the Act. Considering that a joint venture has an
ambivalent nature, with pro- and anticompetitive effects, it is suggested that a
joint venture accompanied by structural changes in the participating firms will
be dealt with in principle under merger control, where its cooperative effects
are reviewed altogether. A joint venture for simple cooperation should be
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concentrations under Council Regulation No. 139/2004, Note 5, where the turnover of the joint
ventures should be determined according to the most recent audited accounts of the parent
companies, or the joint venture itself, depending upon the availability of separate accounts for
the resources combined in the joint venture.
processed within a simplified procedure under certain circumstances. This
would result in procedural economies without harming effective competition.
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